

English Heritage Battlefield Report: Hopton Heath 1643

Hopton Heath (19 March 1643)

Parishes: Salt and Enson; Hopton and Coton

District: Stafford

County: Staffordshire

Grid Ref: SJ 954263

Historical Context

By March 1643 the English Civil War between the forces of the King and Parliament was only a few months old. Following the first clashes of the previous autumn and a period of relative inactivity over the winter, both sides now looked to consolidate their strategic position in the provinces. To this end, although his own position at Oxford remained insecure, King Charles was prepared to send the Earl of Northampton and a small force from the outpost at Banbury to try and retrieve the situation in Staffordshire, where Lichfield was besieged. Northampton was too late to save Lichfield but he was able to effect a junction with the North Midland forces of Colonel-General Henry Hastings. Together they mustered some 1,200 men, nearly all mounted troops.

In the wake of his success at Lichfield, the Parliamentarian commander, Sir John Gell, aimed to capture Stafford. On 19 March he advanced from Lichfield with 750 men, having arranged to meet Sir William Brereton, who was bringing a similar sized force from Cheshire, on Hopton Heath, between two and three miles outside Stafford. The Earl of Northampton, however, had arrived at the town the day before and, hearing that the enemy was assembling on Hopton Heath, marched out to meet them.

Location and Description of the Battlefield

Hopton Heath lies between two and three miles to the northwest of Stafford. It reaches an average height of nearly 450 feet and is the highest point in the ground between the River Sow, on which Stafford stands, to the south, and the River Trent, a mile away to the north. There is a steep escarpment between Hopton Heath and the Trent, at the bottom of which sits Salt village.

Hopton Heath is flanked to east and west by roads leading to Stafford from Uttoxeter and Newcastle-under-Lyme. The two roads, along which Gell and Brereton approached the battlefield, one from Lichfield and the other from Cheshire, cross the Trent at the villages of Weston and Sandon respectively.

The village of Hopton itself shelters in the lee of the heath, at its south-western edge. The ground here falls away from the heath plateau perhaps 50 feet, as far as a stream which drains away through a small valley from Hopton Pools, east of the village.

Most of the battlefield today consists of either pasture or small woods, although crops grow in the fields by Heathyards. An extensive RAF depot covers the remainder of the battlefield.

Landscape Evolution

Between 1769 and 1775 Staffordshire was surveyed by William Yates and, upon completion, a map published¹. The detail of the map is such that the pre-enclosure topography of Hopton Heath becomes clear. The heath extends northwards as far as Enston (Enson), but the bulk of it is concentrated on the plateau between the village of Hopton and the Trent. To the east the heath is bounded by the walls of Ingestre Park. To the west are

the fields of Hopton village, crossed by a series of tracks which halt at the heath's edge.

Yates' County Map of 1770's is confirmed by the unsigned, possibly 17th century, plan of the battlefield locality². The landscape was dominated by Hopton Heath and by Salt Heath to the north-east, and by the enclosed deer park to the south-west. Also important was the escarpment delineating the Trent Valley which influenced the routes taken by the Parliamentarians up onto the Heath.

The Heath, of gorse and grassland, was surrounded by field enclosures associated with the villages of Hopton, Salt and Weston. Later map evidence also shows the likely existence of a single small enclosure on the Heath itself, the site of the present day Heathyards. This enclosure coincides with the stone wall boundary still to be traced on the ground.

Heathyards, seen today, is clearly not the original property, but no matter: the house was surrounded by a large enclosure, and a walled close, as shall be seen during the examination of the sources which follows, played a crucial part in the battle. Great stress is laid on the presence of the 'Heathyards' enclosure in the best modern study of the Battle of Hopton Heath, undertaken by the late Colonel Alfred Burne³. Burne based his reconstruction of the battlefield on Yates' map, and while it is true that the Colonel never asked himself whether the house and grounds shown in 1775 existed 130 years previously, it is hard to imagine for what purpose walls would have existed in 1643 on a barren heath if not to enclose a property such as this. It is therefore probably safe to assume that an earlier version of Heathyards was in place at the time of the battle.

Hopton Heath has changed radically since the battle with the introduction of hedged field enclosures between 1770 and 1788 - Sir Thomas Clifford, whose *History of Tixall* was published in 1817, described how Hopton Heath was enclosed 'about thirty years ago by the father of the present Earl of Shrewsbury'⁴. With enclosure came the improvement of the grazing and, later, the planting of wooded coverts in the early 19th century. There has been little change since then.

There is one recent exception to this, the RAF storage depot, which has had a major impact on the battlefield area. The depot, together with the woodland plantations which obscure part of the higher ground, make it difficult to appreciate the battlefield landscape, although the site does retain some openness particularly around Heathyards where the Parliamentary left wing was positioned.

The Battle and the Sources

The best source for the Battle of Hopton Heath is a letter preserved in the Dunrobin Muniments. It is unsigned but clearly written by an eyewitness amongst the Royalists:

Upon the Sunday followeing about 11 of the clocke intelligence was given us of the Rebels beinge seene upon Hopton heath not above 4 miles from Stafford whereupon with all possible speed our forces drew out of the towne, but it was neare thre of the clocke ere wee could get together from all our quarters, for that the towne of Stafford was not able to reseate half our Army, though I conceive it did not consist of above 1000 horse and foote, the enemy beinge twice as many, they beinge first in the field had the advantage of chooseinge the ground which they did soe that they had not only hedges and old walls which served them for breast workes and were by them soe lyned with musquetteeres that they stood soe secure, besides their maine body of musquette and pikes stood upon a warren full of Cunney holes where horse could not charge without greate danger and hazard. They had 8 Drakes and 3 greate peeces all upon the advantage of a hill which to come unto had moorish grounde to hinder our approaches on the right hand and on the left their hedges and walls lyned with shott as I said before. All which disadvantages hindered us not nor any whit daunted our courage, but after we had drawne our men into a body within halfe cannon chott, wee made a stand for halfe an

houre or thereabouts. In which tyme wee drew out some dragooners, and sent them to enter the closes and beate of their muskette which lay in the hedges which they performed with greate resolucon. Att this tyme alsoe wee drew up our Cannon which was one very good piece and did great execucon for the first shott killed six of their men and hurt four and the next made such a lane through them that they had little minde to close agayne.

All this tyme their Cannon and Drakes played as fast as they could upon our men and did noe greate execucon, for wee were soe nigh that their greate pieces shott over us. We charged them with our horse so furiously that they beganne to runne and ours followed execution (I feare) too farre, for the Earle himselve flew into the chieftest of them, where by the fallinge of his horse hee had the misfortune to come into their hands. True it is that his horse received a shott but himselve had not then received any hurt, though (it is to bee feared) he was most barbarously butchered by them. Att this first charge wee gained their cannon and here Sir Thomas Byron left some few Dragooners and a guard of horse which he noe sooner quitted (with intention to fetch up some more to make a stand and to stopp the rest from further pursuite) but those horse came off and some of their Rebels reserve of horse came up and regayned their Cannon. But our horse were agayne gathered together in a body and charged and beat them the 2nd tyme from their Cannon and here their horse fell soe foule upon their foote that they were soe much disordered that the Pikemen stood with their pikes ordered and did not so much as charge but some of them strucke with them and att this tyme Sir Thomas Byron received 2 hurts ... Hee beinge hurt together with the miss of the Earl of North[hamp]ton did dishearten our men that they would not bee easily persuaded to pursue that advantage which wee had gained through Generall Hastinge and the rest of the Officers with persuasions and expressions befittinge men of their honneur and condicons made appeare in a very high and noble way their resolucons to lead them on agayne, but with much labour they were gotten together into a body and made a stand with intenton to charge agayne. But the truth is, it was soe late that nothings could be donne without hazard of great confusion in the darke nor was our cannon or ammunicion drawne up as yett wherefore order was given first to drawe off our Cannon with the 8 Drakes wee had taken of theirs which was accordingly donne and a guard of Dragooners sent with them into the towne, the rest of the army retired but quitted not the field that night⁵.

From this account we learn that the battle started late on a winter afternoon because it took the Royalists an excessive length of time to gather their troops together. The delay allowed the Parliamentarians to make a careful deployment, using hedges and old walls as a breastwork for their musketeers and placing their main body in the midst of a rabbit warren. The Parliamentarian cannon were probably sited near Heathyards since, according to the writer, they stood on a hill and Heathyards is the highest point of Hopton Heath.

The approaches to the 'hill', we are told, were made more difficult by moorish ground on the right hand 'and on the left their hedges and walls lyned with shott as I said before'. The writer's meaning is not altogether plain but when he refers to the left and right hand he probably means the Parliamentarians' left and right. To interpret him in this fashion avoids having the writer contradict the pamphlet account of the battle which will be cited next. It also allows the walls and hedges on the left to be accounted for by the former western boundary of Ingestre Park and Heathyards enclosure.

The first half hour of the battle was given over to skirmishing amongst the closes and an artillery duel. Although the Parliamentarians possessed the more numerous cannon the Royalists had the heaviest piece of ordnance, a 29 pound demi-cannon known as 'Roaring Meg' which did significant damage. The battle was then entered upon in earnest. The Royalist cavalry made two charges and would have performed a third but for the onset of darkness. The enemy cannon were captured, lost and recaptured again. Amongst the Royalist casualties were the Earl of Northampton, who was killed, and Sir Thomas Byron, but the writer went on to remark that 'they lost tenne men for one of ours ... what were slayne of the Rebels cannot certainly bee knowne

for that they threw hundreds of them into pooles and pitts thereby to conceale their losse'.

A second Royalist account of what took place is contained in a letter dated Stafford 21 March and published in the pamphlet *The Battaile on Hopton-Heath in Staffordshire, Betweene His Majesties Forces under the Right Honourable the Earle of Northampton and those of the Rebels, March 19.*

...about twelve of the clock we had intelligence of Sr W Brereton and Sr John Gells being met with all their forces, being about 3000 Horse and Foote, placed upon a Heath called Hopton Heath neare a Towne called Weston some two miles from Stafford. We drew out our Horse and Dragoons being about 900. And the Heath seeming faire resolved to charge them, the breadth of it being more than Musket-shot from inclosure on each side. As we advanced we discovered Musketeers placed within a walled Close, and some Musketeers and drakes in hedges on our right wing. Against which we sent some of our Musketeers but these being too few to beat them, by order of counsell we advanced with our whole body of Horse (leaving onely a Reserve) towards their body, and upon our advancing their Musketeers ran from the hedges, we charging their body their Horse presently ran, and we forced them to quit their Cannon. But our men following the Execution beyond command, and our Musketeers not coming up, they got some of their Cannon againe, yet we brought off 8 peeces. And then rallying up our horse againe as soone as we could, we charged some other Horse which they had neare their Foot, which presently retreated and ran, and then Sir Thomas Byron at the head of the Princes Regiment chargeing their Foot broke in among them, but they having some Troops of Horse neare their Foot, fell upon him, and then he received his hurts, bleeding so that he was not able to stay in the field. But by reason of the night and our Horses being weary we stood about a Musket-shot from them, and after a time our men being weary, we drew somewhat further off, keeping strong parties nearer them. The next morning by breake of day we made ready to fall in againe, but finding no Enemy, we then understood that they had marched away in the night about an hour after our parting with them, there we found carriages, with Ammunition and other things, & the fore carriages of their Cannon, which makes us beleeve they have throwne the rest of their Cannon into some pooles thereabouts. In this fight (and in that former skirmish on Friday) we took and killed above 300, and wounded at the least 500 more (for our Horse charged their Foot which occasioned so many wounded) as their owne men confesse whom since we tooke prisoners. We have taken above 300 of their Horse, 8 peeces of Cannon, with a great deal of other Ammunition⁶.

The author of this account remarks on the enemy's occupation of a series of enclosures. Their musketeers defend a 'walled close' and they place cannon and further musketeers 'in hedges on our right wing' (i.e. the Parliamentarian left), all of which is reminiscent of what we learnt from the Dunrobin manuscript. However, the reference by the pamphlet's author to there being enclosures either side of the heath introduces a fresh element. Between the two sets of enclosures is a gap equivalent to twice the range of a musket, 400-500 yards. Looking at Yates' map the only piece of ground which appears to match this description is the neck of the heath between the Heathyards enclosure and the fields of Hopton village where Hoptonhall Lane (see the modern Ordnance Survey map) meets Within Lane. Yet if the Parliamentarian right flank were really posted near the top of Hoptonhall Lane it would be pushed rather far forward and onto slightly lower ground, so the thought must be treated with caution.

With regard to the actual fighting, the pamphlet relates that after some rather ineffective skirmishing the Royalist cavalry attacked. They charged more than once, driving off the bulk of the Parliamentarian Horse and capturing some guns. Nightfall however prevented the Royalists charging a third time and next morning they discovered that the enemy had retreated. The writer of the pamphlet was of the opinion that the Parliamentarians disposed of the remainder of their ordnance by throwing it into nearby pools, a belief that the Dunrobin author shared. Incidentally, the account of the Battle of Hopton Heath in Clarendon's *History of the Rebellion* is based on the contents of this pamphlet.

The Parliamentarian commander Sir William Brereton wrote the best account of Hopton Heath to emerge from his side:

Upon the 19th day of March, being the Sabbath-day, I marched from Newcastle to Stone, and soe to Sand, and joyned with Sir John Gell's forces neare unto Salt heath, about two of the clocke in the afternoon. Our forces were much disproportionable to the enemies, who did very far exceed us in horse; whereof there were two regiments brought downe by the earle of Northampton. One was his own regiment, the other was the prince his regiment. There was joyned thereunto the forces of colonell Hastings, who is very strong in horse. And the Shropshire horse and dragoons, which was a great addition to their strength. These came on with great resolution and boldnes, and in very good order. Some say there were six score, others judge there were 200 in front, when they came up and charged our horse. Some report there were 2500 horse of theirs; whereas we had not 400 horse at the most, whereof I brought two troopes. And I believe there were about five companies of dragoons; whereof I brought three; some of which did extraordinary good service. There were near 100 of the dragoons slaine in the place where the dragoons skirmished; and I cannot discerne that we lost more than two or three. And yet they fought so long, and so fiercely, untill all their powder and bullet was spent. Afterwards they joyned, and fell to it pell mell, one upon another, with the stocks of their musketts ... [It] was a great disadvantage to us, that both our horse and foote were unhappily disposed of and divided into small bodyes, at such time as the enemy charged us, which was the occasion that the greatest parte of our horse were disordered, and routed, yet very few of them slaine.

I doe not believe that all our foot there present could make five hundred men; against which the enemies horse were encouraged to make a most desperate attempt, which did produce and occasion their own destruction. Herein the wisdom and goodness of Divine Providence is to be taken notice of, and acknowledged, that the disordering and dispersing the greatest part of our horse should encourage them, with their horse, to charge furiously upon our foote, who by the discharge of their first volley of shott did perform mighty greate execution. The earle of Northampton was then dismounted, and after slaine...

Our foote, through God's blessing, were soe successful, (many of them being inexpert, having never formerly been upon service,) did mightie execution upon the enemy, who were thereby rather enraged than discouraged from making a second as desperate an assault, which was equally (if not more) fatall unto them, who, as wee have been informed, out of some letters and acknowledgments of some of their parte, confess that they lost neere three score of their most prime and eminent commanders ... Some of the inhabitants of the countrey report, there were neere 600 dead bodies carried away from the field the next morning, whereof, I am confident, there were not thirtie of our men⁷.

Brereton, because he was approaching the battlefield from the north-west, had to cross Salt Heath before he could unite with Sir John Gell. This he did at 2pm, an hour before the scattered Royalists were able to gather and arrive at the field. After the dragoons on each side had skirmished the Royalists attacked and broke the bulk of the Parliamentarian Horse, but the Foot held firm. Brereton felt that the fact that Gell had distributed the Parliamentarians in penny packets - presumably in the defence of enclosures and the like - was a disadvantage.

Another Parliamentarian account of the Battle of Hopton Heath appeared in the edition of the newsletter *Special Passages* for the week 21-28 March 1643:

My Lord of Northampton being come to Stafford, and joyned with the forces of Collonel Hastings and

others, understanding that Sir John Gell and Sir William Brewerton was neer with an inconsiderable number in regard of themselves, they being but 6 troops of horse, and some 500 Muskettiers, besides club-men, issued out of Stafford with 25 troops besides Dragoneers; thinking at an instant to devoure that poore number at one blowe. Which when they were come in sight of the Parliaments forces, they with a mightie furious charge, French-like, came upon them, and had almost routed the Parliament partie, riding over divers of the foot; but they were so pelted by the Musket shot, and with the little bullet Drakes, that they were driven back with great losse. Yet they came on again, seeing that all the Parliament horse but 2 troops left the foot, but in their second assault they lost more then at the first; the Earl of Northampton being killed, and a brave Mounsier that was Sarjeant Major of the Kings Regiment, and many Captains and Commanders. But they charged a third time and had no better successe than in the other two. During this fight, there was a dispatch made to bring up some 200 of Sir William Brewertons that were behind, Sir William himself being in the first encounter: and of these 200 but 100 had muskets. These demanded who were the enemy, it was answered, they that had so many Colours: whereupon they advanced and let flie at the enemie. The enemie seeing a new power, and supposing them to be more than they were, wheeled about and left the field: the Parliament forces keeping the field untill 12 at night, and then retreated to their quarters⁸.

In common with almost all the descriptions of the battle quoted so far the newsletter inflates the numbers of the enemy, stressing how overmatched its own side was. The Royalist cavalry charge furiously, pressing home their attack sword in hand in imitation of the French. As before we gather that most of the Parliamentary cavalry fled, leaving the Foot to fend for itself. However, despite the fact that they made no fewer than three separate charges, the Royalists were unable to prevail; the appearance of 200 fresh infantry from Brereton's force settled the day.

The final impression of the Battle of Hopton Heath is contained in an extract from *A true account of the raising and imploying of one foote regiment under Sir John Gell...*

They [*Gell's Regiment*] after joyned with Sir Will. Bryerton who brought some horse and went against Stafford, but the enemie being farre stronger than was expected, the earle of Northampton with above 1000 horse came out of Stafford, and fell upon our men on a heath within two myles of Stafford; at the very first encounter all our horse fled, except about 240 of the lord Brooke's reformader troupe, who behaved themselves all very gallantly. Our collonell quitted his horse, and went to the foote, being then in great feare and disorder, many of them readie to rune, and standing with theyre pykes advanced; the colonell, with his owne hands, put downe theyre pykes, encouraged both them and the musquetyers, who were all disorderly, [and] crowded together; he speedely gott them into order and gave the enemie such a vollie of shott upon theyre chardge, that they first wheeled, and much discouraged by the death of the earle of Northampton and Captain Middleton, with dyvers others, gentlemen and officers, they all presently fledd⁹.

Lucy Hutchinson, the biographer of her husband, Colonel Hutchinson, acknowledged that Gell's regiment was composed of 'good stout fighting men'. But the fearless character given to Gell in this and other accounts of his exploits she found risible:

Some that knew him well, said he was not valiant, though his men once held him up, among a stand of pikes, while they obtained a glorious victory, when the Earl of Northampton was slain; certain it is he was never by his good will in a fight, but either by chance or necessity; and that which made his courage the more questioned was, the care he took, and the expense he was at, to get it weekly mentioned in the journals¹⁰.

The fact that both sides claimed the victory might at first suggest that the Parliamentary and Royalist views of the battle are irreconcilable. But on closer inspection the version of events that emerges from one side is remarkably consistent with that which emerges from the other. True, each side believed that the other possessed a numerical superiority, but this is a not uncommon phenomenon. Brigadier Peter Young looked into this issue carefully in an article on the battle published in the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* and came to the conclusion that the Royalists fielded 1200 men, including 800 cavalry and 300 dragoons, and the Parliamentarians c.1450 men, a total comprising 750 Foot, 400 cavalry and 300 dragoons¹¹.

Otherwise, the accounts of the battle which have come down to us all tend to agree that the Royalist Horse enjoyed a reasonable degree of success but that they failed to clear the Parliamentary Foot from the field. Thereafter it is a matter of opinion what constitutes victory: the fact that the Parliamentary Foot were still in position at nightfall when, as the Royalists themselves admitted, they drew back a little; or the fact that next morning the Royalists occupied the field after the Parliamentarians retreated in the night? The Royalists, of course, had captured eight guns, but the Parliamentarians considered their killing of the enemy commander, the Earl of Northampton, of equal significance: they offered Northampton's body in exchange for the return of their artillery, an offer which the Royalists indignantly refused.

Indication of Importance

Beyond saving Stafford for the Royalist cause and facilitating the subsequent recapture of Lichfield, the Battle of Hopton Heath was not of great strategic importance. Nevertheless, as Brigadier Peter Young commented, the battle is of interest tactically because, as at Roundway Down, a mounted force engaged and got the better of a more balanced force of Horse and Foot¹². The struggle was also keenly contested, with the Royalist commanders displaying a reckless courage which led a disproportionate number of them to become casualties. Estimates of the total number of killed and wounded in the battle varied but it may have been as many as between three and five hundred.

The different sources provide a good picture of the course of the battle although, as S A H Burne complained in 1936 (when publishing the Dunrobin manuscript for the first time), they are less helpful in resolving 'the difficulty experienced in reconstructing the physical conditions of the battlefield'¹³. Fortunately, in this regard, the use first made by Colonel Alfred Burne of Yates' map of 1775 to shed light on the nature of Hopton Heath's pre-enclosure landscape has enabled progress to be made. Colonel Burne, at the same time, drew attention to an interesting archaeological discovery on the battlefield, the uncovering of one of Roaring Meg's 6 inch diameter cannonballs during the construction of the RAF depot about the time of the Second World War¹⁴.

Battlefield Area

The battlefield area boundary defines the outer reasonable limit of the battle, taking into account the positions of the combatants at the outset of fighting and the focal area of the battle itself. It does not include areas over which fighting took place subsequent to the main battle. Wherever possible, the boundary has been drawn so that it is easily appreciated on the ground.

The battlefield area lies between the A518 Stafford to Weston road to the east, Within Lane to the south and south-west and Brick Kiln Lane and Brick-kiln Covert to the north. It has been argued that the walls of Ingestre Park provided the anchor for the Parliamentary left flank, so placing the battlefield boundary on the A518, which runs alongside the park wall, makes sense. It has been contended likewise that the northern wall of the Heathyards enclosure ran part of the way along what is now Brick Kiln Lane, so that supplies another boundary.

Only when the Lane reaches Brick-kiln Covert does the battlefield line deviate from the road, following the north-western margin of Brick-kiln Covert before resuming its south-westwards direction towards the junction

of Brick Kiln Lane and Within Lane. The incorporation of Brick-kiln Covert ensures that the 'military crest' remains within the battlefield area; the ground begins to descend to the River Trent further north. It seems more probable that the Parliamentarians would have kept to the higher ground as much as possible rather than push their right flank forward. Besides, their line of battle would most likely have tended towards Salt Heath, because that was the direction from which Brereton approached the battlefield.

Within the battlefield area the Parliamentary front extends nearly half a mile, quite a distance for 1,500 men; but Brereton remarked how dispersed the Parliamentarians were and the comment of one Royalist source to the effect that there was a gap the width of two musket shots through which to charge also implies an extended front.

The Royalist line of battle was not as long as that of the Parliamentarians. Brereton writes that it was believed the Royalist Horse deployed with up to 200 men to the front. Allowing five foot per horse that would give a frontage of nearly 400 yards, including the intervals between troops. The Royalists would have deployed three deep, since they intended to rely on shock action rather than the discharge of their pistols. A further 200 horsemen would have been kept in reserve. The Royalist dragoons skirmished to the right, towards the Heathyards enclosure.

Behind the Royalists, Within Lane is the obvious battlefield boundary. Beyond it the ground begins to fall away more rapidly. The Royalists drew up, we are told, within half cannonshot - perhaps 400 yards - of the enemy, so there is no need to situate their army any further to the south.

Two final points about the disposition of the armies and the selection of a battlefield area require to be made. The Royalist belief that the Parliamentarians abandoned their three remaining cannon in pools of water was mere supposition, an explanation for the otherwise perplexing disappearance of the guns. It is unnecessary to try and explain how the Parliamentarians could have abandoned their ordnance in, for instance, Hopton Pools, which lay behind the Royalist lines, nor is it necessary to include the pools in the battlefield area. They may, after all, post-date the battle.

The second point concerns the claim made by one Royalist that there were enclosures on both sides of the heath. While a theory was advanced above to try and reconcile the statement with what else we knew about the course of the battle and the terrain, it seems more likely that the writer was referring to enclosed fields to either side of the heath rather than on either side.

Notes

1. *A Map of the County of Stafford*. The Staffordshire Record Society, 4th Series, vol. 12 (1984).
2. See the frontispiece to Walter Chetwynd's *History of the Pirehill Hundred* (Staffordshire Record Society, 1909).
3. See *The Old Stafford Record Society. Transactions* 1951-2 pp24-29. This piece by Colonel Burne provides the basis of the account of the Battle of Hopton Heath which appears in his book *The Great Civil War* (London 1959), written in conjunction with Brigadier Peter Young.
4. *Collections for a History of Staffordshire*, ed. by the William Salt Society (1931) p82.
5. Published in the Staffordshire Record Society's volume for 1936, pages 181-4.
6. Thomason Tract E.99 (18) in the British Library.
7. Printed in Stebbing Shaw *The History and Antiquities of Staffordshire* I (London 1798) p54.
8. Thomason Tract E.94 (15) in the British Library.
9. Printed in *The History and Antiquities of Staffordshire* op. cit. p57.
10. Hutchinson, Lucy *Memoirs of the Life of Colonel Hutchinson* (Everyman edition, 1968) pp101-3.
11. Young, Lt-Col. Peter 'The Battle of Hopton Heath, 19th March, 1643' *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* XXXIII (1954) pp35-9.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Staffordshire Record Society volume for 1936, p181.
14. *Op. cit.* Note 3.