

English Heritage Battlefield Report: Marston Moor 1644

Marston Moor (2 July 1644)

Parishes: Long Marston; Wilstrop; Tockwith; Bilston-in-Ainsty with Bickerton

District: Harrogate

County: North Yorkshire

Grid Ref: SE 491521 (centred on the battlefield monument)

Historical Context

At the beginning of 1644, the third year of the Civil War between King and Parliament, the situation in the north of England was transformed by the intervention on the Parliamentary side of a Scottish army over 20,000 strong. The hitherto victorious Royalist commander, the Marquess of Newcastle, was suddenly faced with a war on two fronts and by April 1644 the bulk of his field army was under siege in York. To prevent the fall of York and the loss of the north of England Prince Rupert led a relieving force from the main Royalist army in the Midlands. He successfully raised the siege at the end of June.

Two days later, on 2 July 1644, Prince Rupert offered battle to his opponents on Marston Moor, to the west of York. His army of 18,000 men faced a combined Scottish and Parliamentary force 28,000 strong.

Location and Description of the Battlefield

Marston Moor battlefield lies some five miles west of York between the villages of Tockwith and Long Marston. One of those present at the battle, Scoutmaster-General Lionel Watson, in describing the deployment of the Allied forces (i.e. the Scots and the Parliamentary forces) and their Royalist opponents, was explicit about this: 'The right wing of our army [was] placed just by Merston [sic] Town side ... with the utmost point of our left wing, to Topwith [i.e. Tockwith]; being a mile and a half in length; the enemy being drawn up just under us, the wings of their army extending a little further than ours...'¹. None of the other participants who recalled the battle put it so succinctly.

A monument to the battle was erected by the Cromwell Association in 1936 and is sited on the Tockwith Road.

Landscape Evolution

In 1644 the battlefield comprised three contrasting landscapes. One area, stretching between the villages of Long Marston and Tockwith mostly south of the road, consisted of arable open fields with few hedges. Within these open fields there were probably some small hedged enclosures. North of these arable fields, and in stark contrast to them, was a mostly open area of occasionally boggy moorland used as rough pasture and probably covered in part with gorse and heather. To the north of the moor lay a large block of woodland called Widstrop Wood. Through the area ran the present day Long Marston to Tockwith road, the lane now called Atterwith Lane running north-east towards Hessay and possibly the lane now called Moor Lane.

The exact junction of the arable fields with the moorland lay just north of the present day Long Marston to Tockwith road. This junction occurs around the 20 metre contour line and is marked on a modern maps by a curving field boundary which marks a distinct discontinuity with the field patterns now lying further north. The

Royalist front position lay along this line. The ditch, where it has not been filled, follows a curving line that is older than other field boundaries in the area, but the hedge lying on it, now discontinuous, does not appear (from the few species in it) to be old.

The moor itself was drained by a series of natural watercourses such as the present day Hole Beck and a beck called White Sike which runs eastward towards White Sike bridge as well as other artificial ditches. It is possible that the drainage system was more dense than it is today; the unreclaimed Wilstrop Wood area nearby is heavily ditched.

Through the eastern part of the battlefield ran a lane up which the cavalry of the Parliamentary right wing attempted to advance and were bloodily repulsed. Documentary and field evidence suggests this was Atterwith Lane, which has old hedgerows along its eastern boundary near present day Fox Covert. East of Fox Covert there are old hedgerows which could represent the enclosed fields which the 1776 Enclosure Award calls Hatterwith. Along the eastern side of it, maps mark a drainage ditch called Atterwith Dike.

The open fields lying on the higher ground between Long Marston and Tockwith were enclosed at a relatively early date, the long, narrow curving fields in parts of this area indicating the enclosure of open fields by agreement of the local farming community either in the late 17th or early 18th centuries. However, the boggy moorland was not reclaimed until 1766 when it was enclosed and drained by Parliamentary Act. This laid a regular pattern of straight sided, regularly shaped fields, roads and straight ditches over the moor. The Award mentions pre-existing features such as White Sike, Broken Closes, Old Foss and Moss Carr which were to be incorporated into the new landscape but their exact location and subsequent alterations to them are uncertain. The most detailed research into the subject, by Peter Newman, has made use of the 1766 enclosure award and related it to a 1785 map of the Ainsty of York by Francis White. His conclusions have thrown into doubt some long-held beliefs about the battle, particularly the identification of the last stand of Newcastle's Whitecoats with the feature known as White Sike Close. Newman insists that the Close was created by the enclosure act and did not exist before².

By 1850 Wilstrop Wood had assumed its present day shape and the woodland called Fox Covert had already been planted. The Cromwell Plump group of trees was planted after 1850 but before 1909. On the reclaimed moorland a few farms, such as Marston Grange Farm, had been built within the new fields. The settlements of Long Marston and Tockwith themselves have not grown substantially since 1850, and probably were not greatly smaller in 1644 than they are now.

The area is still almost completely rural in aspect with only the electricity power lines running west of Atterwith Lane betraying the 20th century. Long Marston and Tockwith are unremarkable but unspoilt villages and local roads are relatively quiet. The most important recent change is the on-going rationalisation of the local hedgerows, which is creating a more open landscape but removing valuable evidence of the battlefield. The small group of trees at Cromwell Plump still attract the eye to the low ridge of the Parliamentary initial position.

The Battle: its interpretation

The first modern writers to pen scholarly accounts of the Battle of Marston Moor did so during the second half of the 19th century. The source material, in terms of eye-witness accounts, was by then pretty well known, and little has come to light in more recent times that could, of itself, prompt a large-scale revision. However, Marston Moor has long been acknowledged as a more than usually confusing battle and several writers have pursued contradictory paths. The different interpretations that have resulted ensure that the detailed dispositions of the Royalist and Allied armies, both before the battle and during it, remain a subject of contention.

In painting the background to events one thing is clear: on 2 July 1644 a battle was fought at Marston Moor because Prince Rupert wished it. The previous day he had ostensibly achieved the objective of his campaign by

relieving the forces of the Marquess of Newcastle besieged in York, but the Prince believed that he had orders from the King to bring the enemy to battle and, to the surprise of his opponents, this he now set out to do. The Allied forces, composed of the Scottish army under the Earl of Leven, the Army of the Eastern Association commanded by the Earl of Manchester, and the local Yorkshire forces under Lord Fairfax, had been in the process of abandoning the position near Long Marston from which they had ineffectually attempted to prevent Prince Rupert's relief of York. Suddenly they realised that the Royalist army was issuing from the City to confront them. The Allied troops marching away to Tadcaster to the south were hurriedly recalled and drawn up on the rising ground of Marston Fields.

Meanwhile, Prince Rupert, having taken the bold step of seeking battle, found himself hampered by the tardiness with which Newcastle's men emerged from York to join his field army. Until they arrived to reinforce the line of battle his forces were spread excessively thin. Even with Newcastle's 4000 infantry in the ranks, the consensus of opinion is that Prince Rupert's army totalled only 18,000 men compared to his opponents' 28,000.

The majority of accounts of the battle mention that the Prince deployed his army on Marston Moor behind a physical obstacle, generally interpreted to be a combination of ditch and hedge. The first wave of modern studies, such as that contained in Clements R Markham's *A Life of the Great Lord Fairfax* (London 1870), or the writings of Leadman and Barrett³, depicted the ditch/hedge line as a continuous barrier stretching between Atterwith Dyke on the Royalist left and Sike Beck on their right (see appendix A). The belief that this was how the battlefield had looked in 1644 was reinforced when the existence of a plan of the Royalist dispositions at Marston Moor, drawn up by Sir Bernard de Gomme (who had been equivalent to Prince Rupert's chief of staff at the battle), became more widely known (see appendix B)⁴. De Gomme represented the Royalists as arrayed behind a sweeping concave-shaped row of hedges, which tended to follow the line both of the present Long Marston-Tockwith road and that of a long ditch, still extant in the 19th century and with its line traceable on the Ordnance Survey map even today, set 300-400 yards further to the north. This conjunction, allied to the testimony of eye-witness accounts of the battle, appeared to clinch the position of the Royalists before the fighting began.

Although Brigadier Peter Young, in his monograph *Marston Moor 1644, the Campaign and the Battle* (Kington 1970), adhered to the de Gomme view of the battlefield, other modern writers have challenged this interpretation. Austin Woolrych, in his *Battles of the English Civil War* (London 1961), decided that at its western end the ditch, far from continuing to Sike Beck, curved south to terminate by the Long Marston-Tockwith road opposite Bilton Bream. As such it followed a drain marked on the current Ordnance Survey map: Woolrych argued that after inspecting the terrain, aerial photographs and the 18th century Tockwith enclosure map this appeared to him to represent 'an older and more natural feature than the other field-boundaries in the area'⁵. Woolrych however did not mention de Gomme's plan and it was left to a later scholar, Peter Newman, to contend that de Gomme's was a stylized representation of the battlefield that could not be relied upon. Although Newman had proposed a radical reinterpretation of the ditch/hedge issue in his earlier writings, placing the hedge along the southern side of the Long Marston-Tockwith road and claiming this to have been the boundary between the cultivated land of Marston Field and the unenclosed waste of Marston Moor, he eventually arrived at a standpoint similar to that of Woolrych (although Newman's ditch terminates after arriving from the north, not the east - see appendix F)⁶. The accuracy of the Woolrych-Newman perspective is lent credence by the testimony of Captain William Stewart, an officer with the Scots contingent, who averred that 'There was a great Ditch between the Enemy and us, which ran along the front of the Battell, only between the Earl of Manchesters foot and the enemy there was a plain' [*i.e. to the west the ditch ceased*]⁷.

So the Royalists were set back from an incomplete ditch/hedge line in roughly the order that de Gomme presented them. But what of the Allied forces? In the first batch of the modern studies of the battle, their ranks were uniformly represented as pushed hard up against the Royalists on the other side of the ditch/hedge. This meant that the Allies were depicted as crammed into the narrow stretch of land north of the Tockwith-Long Marston road. The likes of Markham, Leadman and Barrett, if they had felt the need to justify their

interpretation, would have argued that their plans of the battle were intended to show the two sides immediately prior to the action commencing in earnest. They would have cited the account of Lionel Watson who states that at 7 o'clock, just before the general engagement began, the two armies were 'drawn up so close one to the other' that 'both wings [were] within Musket shot'⁸. Colonel A.H. Burne, holding to the same interpretation over fifty years later, is specific: 'without any warning, the whole Allied line advanced (they had previously pushed their line 200 yards forward from the road so that only 250 yards separated the two lines)' (see plan in appendix C)⁹.

However, while it is true that the chaplain of Manchester's Army, Simeon Ashe, reported that the Allies made a preliminary advance of 200 yards (presumably once they were sure that the Royalists were not themselves intending to attack)¹⁰, no evidence is produced to support the assertion that this caused the Allies to edge beyond the road, and it is hard to believe that Prince Rupert would have relaxed his guard and decided that no battle was going to be fought that day if the enemy had approached quite so closely. After all, Watson claims only that both wings were within musket shot, which implies that the infantry in the centre were outside it. If it is recalled that the de Gomme plan shows a Royalist forlorn hope (or advance guard) of musketeers deployed behind the hedge to their front, the distance between the opposing main bodies of infantry must have comfortably exceeded the maximum musketry range of 400 yards (or half that if effective range is the criterion).

Accepting this means that in the centre the Allied infantry would be no further forward than the Tockwith-Long Marston road. And if that were the case it would have made sense for them to have taken their second more advanced position upon the slight rise in the terrain that occurs just south of the road, a rise that interrupts the otherwise gradual fall of the ground from Marston Hill (Peter Newman drew attention to this 'second ridge' and the dead ground that lay behind it - which he dubbed 'the glen' - in his 1978 Borthwick Paper). That the two sides' cavalry on either wing should have eventually advanced within musket shot is less of a surprise: the opposing squadrons would have naturally gravitated towards the gardens and enclosures of Tockwith and Long Marston as a means of securing their flanks.

Although in collaborating with Colonel Burne on the book *The Great Civil War* Brigadier Peter Young seconded his friend's view of the Battle of Marston Moor, when he struck out on his own his interpretation changed. As already noted, Young was impressed with the de Gomme plan and when he made his assessment of the position of the Allies before the battle he took de Gomme at face value. All the contemporary accounts of the battle make it plain that the Allies, in marshalling their army upon its return from the direction of Tadcaster, did so on top of Marston Hill and the ridge that extended either side of it. Simeon Ashe, for example, wrote that 'being on a hill, we had the double advantage of the ground, and the wind'¹¹. This too is where de Gomme depicted the enemy, atop the hill with, as he notes, 'Descending Ground from the hill to the hedge' to their front. However Young, taking no account of Ashe's testimony that the Allies made a preliminary advance (which would have taken them from the slopes of the main ridge down to the crest of the second), has them making their sudden attack from Marston Hill itself: 'It was no more than 1000 yards from Cromwell's Plump [*a feature on top of the ridge*] to the hedge, a distance the Allies could cover in a matter of four minutes without breaking out of a trot'¹². As a consequence the Allies, in Young's map of the battle (see appendix E), remain fixed on the upper slopes of Marston Hill until the main advance begins.

The battlelines of Royalists and Allies have so far been investigated in outline. But an important consideration, for the purpose of defining a battlefield area, is to fix the two sides' flanks. On the Allied left flank, for instance, there had been some jockeying for position by both sides during the course of 2 July before the main action commenced. The day had started with the Allied cavalry around Long Marston acting as a rearguard for the march of their army to Tadcaster. As the numbers of Royalist cavalry began to build up on Marston Moor nearby and the Allied rearguard fell back onto the ridge around Marston Hill, the rearguard commanders realised that the main body of their army was in grave danger of being attacked whilst strung out on route of march. The infantry in the van were hastily recalled. However, as remarked, the slowness with which the Royalist infantry emerged from York dashed any intention Prince Rupert may have had to attack the Allies whilst they were dispersed. He had to concentrate instead on drawing up his army in the most favourable position possible. An attempt was made to gain a share of the ridge in the vicinity of Bilton Bream near Tockwith. But, as Captain Stewart reported, the Royalists were thwarted: 'we sent out a party which beat them

off, and planted there our left wing of Horse¹³. The earlier writers on the battle told of a later fight on the extreme left wing of the Allies at a place called the Rye Hill, north of Tockwith and just west of Sike Beck. But a search on the battlefield for this feature uncovered no trace of it and, in truth, if it existed it could have only come into play were it to have been accepted that the Allies began their attack from a position virtually on top of the Royalists; a notion which this report has already discounted. A reading of the accounts of Marston Moor by Markham and Barrett suggests that, in describing the fight for the Rye Hill, they confused their sources and were in fact writing about the earlier skirmish on Bilton Bream.

On the Allied right flank stood Sir Thomas Fairfax's cavalry. Until Peter Newman argued the importance of Atterwith Lane in the operations at the Long Marston end of the battlefield, those who analysed events placed Sir Thomas's cavalry opposite the ground between Moor Lane and Atterwith Lane. Traditionally (in the 19th century), the Royalist cavalry under Lord George Goring which faced them were represented as standing with their left on Atterwith Dyke, but in the more modern accounts of Burne and Woolrych, Goring's left flank was shifted west of Atterwith Lane.

Newman, however, shows how the testimony of Captain Stewart (see appendix B), so long misunderstood in this particular, that Fairfax's cavalry were constrained to pass along a lane before debouching onto the open moorland, accords with what is now known of the terrain¹⁴. Stewart was not, as previously imagined, referring to Moor Lane (which rendered his testimony nonsensical), but Atterwith Lane. It was in the vicinity of Atterwith Lane that Sir Thomas's men had ridden to disaster (see Fairfax's own account in appendix D). Newman contends that Atterwith Lane became an unexpectedly formidable obstacle because of the high bank alongside it which acted as a boundary between the cultivated land of Marston Fields to the south and the unenclosed moorland to the north. Fairfax's men were constrained to attack through a narrow defile. Lionel Watson mentioned the feature at the time: 'a small di[t]ch and a banck betwixt us and the Moor'¹⁵. That heavy fighting had occurred in the vicinity of this bank was evidenced by the hundreds of musket balls found embedded in the bank when it was levelled in the 1960s. The presence of such relics was all grist to Newman's mill: he had long argued that much more of the fighting during the Battle of Marston Moor had taken place to the east of Moor Lane than was previously thought.

Clearly, the persuasive case made for bringing Atterwith Lane into consideration when determining the course of the struggle at Marston Moor has implications for the battlefield area. But Newman's revisionism goes further than that. Having consistently argued from the amount of lead shot that has been found in the area that particularly heavy fighting occurred on the eastern edge of the battlefield, Newman is always ready to exploit new findings which accord with his main thesis that much of the Marquess of Newcastle's infantry from York arrived late and were still not in position when the fighting began. Thus when, from papers of 1633 taken from the Long Marston parish chest and now in the Borthwick Institute, Newman discovered the existence of the Hatterwith enclosures alongside Atterwith Lane (where the present 'Fox Covert' is situated), he plainly felt vindicated. This enabled him to postulate that the famous last stand of Newcastle's regiment of Whitecoats, which is normally assumed to have taken place in White Sike Close in the centre rear of the royalist position, actually occurred on the Royalist left flank. As such it reflected his belief that the Allies made their attack at 7pm on the evening of 2 July largely because they realised that not all the York infantry were yet in position; Newman in this regard quotes with approval a letter of the Royalist Arthur Trevor written after the battle: 'The enemy perceiving the advance of that addition [*i.e. the York infantry*] to the Prince's army, instantly charged our horse..¹⁶ The Whitecoats, isolated on the left wing, took cover in the Hatterwith enclosures before the tide of Cromwell's cavalry swept over them.

The Course of the Battle

July 2: the Allied army had begun the day by marching off in the direction of Tadcaster and the Scots in the advance guard were within a mile of the town when they received an urgent order to return. The appearance of the Royalists in strength had prompted a reversal of the direction of the army's march to rejoin the cavalry who were still covering the retirement from Marston Moor. While their infantry were doubling back the Allied

horse were disputing the possession of the tactically important features of the battlefield with the Royalist cavalry. The failure of the Royalist advance guard to gain any ground on the left of the ridge handed the initiative back to the Allied commanders. Prince Rupert was thrown onto the defensive and, as he awaited the approach of Newcastle's troops from York, he endeavoured to strengthen his position, as Simeon Ashe recognised:

Yea, by the improving of this opportunitie, they had by divers regiments of Muskettiers so lined the hedge and ditch betwixt themselves and us, that our Souldiers could not assault them, without very great apparent prejudice¹⁷.

The Allied army deployed hastily as regiments arrived back on the ridge around Marston Hill. The Horse on the left flank was commanded by Oliver Cromwell and David Leslie; that on the right was led by Sir Thomas Fairfax. The infantry in the centre was composed of the foot of all three armies. Only between 2pm and 3pm was the Allied deployment completed.

The long-awaited infantry from York arrived on the moor between 4pm and 5pm and began to deploy as a second line behind the Royalist centre. To their rear stood a body of cavalry under Sir William Blakiston with a further reserve under Rupert. The right of the Royalist line was taken by Lord Byron with 3000 horse and 500 foot under Colonel Thomas Napier, who used what there was of a ditch on this flank for much needed protection. Byron's wing faced the full might of the Eastern Association cavalry of Oliver Cromwell. Lord Goring commanded the Royalist left, which consisted predominantly of the Northern Horse, also supported by musketeers. It was by now so late in the day that Rupert appears to have concluded that there was insufficient time for further fighting before darkness fell. The Royalists dropped their guard.

At about 7pm the Allied army suddenly advanced towards the enemy at a running pace as a clap of thunder rent the heavens. The leading troops were soon across the ditch/hedge line to the Royalist front upon which they closed with the enemy. On the left the Allied dragoons cleared most of the ditch and hedges of Royalist musketeers and Cromwell's cavalry moved forward with little difficulty to engage Byron's cavalry. In advancing to meet them Byron's men masked the fire of many of their own infantry. Lionel Watson witnessed the fight:

Our front divisions of Horse charged their front, Lieutenant Generall Cromwels division of three hundred Horse, in which himselfe was in person, charged the first division of Prince Ruperts ... The rest of ours charged other divisions of theirs, but with such admirable vigour, as it was to the astonishment of all the old Souldiers of the Army¹⁸.

After a short struggle, during which Cromwell was wounded, Byron's first line of horse turned and fled. On the Allied right, however, Sir Thomas Fairfax's cavalry found the terrain too difficult and their attack was repulsed by Goring. As Captain William Stewart put it:

The right wing of our Foot [i.e. Horse] had severall misfortunes, for betwixt them and the enemy there was no passage but at a narrow Lane, where they could not march above 3 or 4 in front, upon the one side of the Lane was a Ditch, and on the other an Hedge, both whereof were lined with Muskettiers, notwithstanding Sir Thomas Fairfax charged gallantly, but the enemy keeping themselves in a body, and receiving them by threes and foures as they marched out of the Lane, and (by what mistake I know not) Sir Thomas Fairfax his new leavied regiment being in the Van, they wheeled about, and being hotly pursued by the enemy came back upon the L. Fairfax Foot, and the reserve of the Scottish Foot, broke them wholly, and trod the most part of them under foot¹⁹.

Many of Fairfax's troopers left the field altogether with a good proportion of Goring's men following in pursuit. The most senior Allied commanders, witnessing the debacle on their right flank, fled also: Lords Leven and

Fairfax disappeared completely; the Earl of Manchester returned later.

Back on the far wing Rupert led his reserve against Cromwell in an attempt to stabilise the Royalist front:

Upon the alarm the Prince mounted to horse and galloping up to the right wing, met his own regiment turning their backs to the enemy which was a thing so strange and unusual he said "'swounds, do you run, follow me," so they facing about, he led them to a charge...²⁰

Lionel Watson resumes his account:

Cromwell's own division had a hard pull of it: for they were charged by Rupert's bravest men, both in front and flank: they stood at the sword's point a pretty while, hacking one another: but at last (it so pleased God) he brake through them, scattering them before him like a little dust.

In the centre the Royalist cavalry met with more success and broke through the Allied infantry as far as the summit of the ridge. However some resolute Scottish infantry regiments prevented a full-scale rout developing and the Royalist impetus was checked. By now the ranks of both armies had been considerably thinned by desertion as well as casualties and when Cromwell led his victorious cavalry round the back of the Royalist line there was no body of troops left in the field which could resist him. The remainder of Goring's cavalry were scattered and, in an enclosure, a last stand was mounted by the best of Newcastle's infantry, the Whitecoats. Lieutenant-Colonel James Somerville, a Scot, described the struggle, which lasted almost an hour:

Here the parliament horse of that wing received their greatest loss, and a stop for some time to their hoped-for victory, and that only by the stout resistance of this gallant battalion, ... until at length a Scots regiment of dragoons, commanded by Colonel Frizeall [Hugh Fraser], with other two, was brought to open them upon some hand, which at length they did; when all their ammunition was spent, having refused quarters, every man fell in the same order and rank wherein he had fought²¹.

With the destruction of the Whitecoats the battle ended.

Indication of Importance

Marston Moor is an immensely significant battlefield. It was by far the largest battle of the English Civil War, which is not surprising in view of the fact that it brought together three armies on the Parliamentary side - those of the Scots, the Eastern Association and Lord Fairfax's local forces - against two on the Royalist side: the northern army of the Marquess of Newcastle and the contingent brought from Shropshire by Prince Rupert. Defeat cost the Royalists control of the North of England, with serious consequences for their ability to prosecute the war. Newcastle's army, full of experienced soldiers, ceased to exist (the Marquess himself gave the war up as lost and went into voluntary exile). Prince Rupert's reputation for invincibility was shattered and the standing of Oliver Cromwell in both military and political spheres was notably enhanced.

Whereas with most battles a dearth of source material leads to obscurity and confusion, the case of Marston Moor is very different: here the sheer extent of the written sources available provides scope for divergent interpretation. Different historians have laid their emphasis on different accounts of the battle. However, notwithstanding these differences, the essentials of Marston Moor are clear enough. Recent archaeological discoveries have added to our understanding of the nature of the battle.

Battlefield Area

The battlefield area boundary defines the outer reasonable limit of the battle, taking into account the positions of the combatants at the outset of fighting and the focal area of the battle itself. It does not include areas over which fighting took place subsequent to the main battle. Wherever possible, the boundary has been drawn so that it is easily appreciated on the ground.

As befits, in terms of the numbers engaged, the greatest confrontation of the English Civil Wars, the bounds of the battlefield are correspondingly large: approximately seven square kilometres. On the southern edge of the battlefield the boundary is drawn to encompass the crest of the ridge by Marston Hill and Bilton Moor. This provides space for the deployment of the Allied army in accordance with the de Gomme plan. It also takes in the ground from which the Allied cannon initially bombarded the enemy, Simeon Ashe having noted that before they made their sudden assault the Allies brought forward their artillery 'which had plaid one or two houres before from the top of the Hill'²².

The Allied left flank is delimited by Sike Beck. The valley created by the beck marks the western edge of the ridge upon which the Allies were drawn up. By taking Sike Beck as the boundary of the battlefield area this leaves sufficient room to accommodate the Allied cavalry on the Left: the Royalist colonel, Sir Henry Slingsby, who knew the local area well, wrote that 'Cromwell having ye left wing drawn into 5 bodys of horse, came off the Cony Warren, by Bilton bream, to charge our horse'²³. The rabbit warren lay between Sike Beck and Bilton Bream.

In tracing a line around the Royalist right flank the easiest course is to follow the course of Sike Beck north of the Tockwith-Long Marston road until it reaches Tockwith Moor. This excludes from the battlefield area the feature identified by early analysts of the battle as 'Rye Hill'. The justification for accounting this barely discernible 'hill' part of the battlefield has long been questioned.

North of Tockwith Moor the boundary of the battlefield area has been drawn along Moor Lane and then around the southern edge of the small wood called Swale's Rash. This is to allow room on the Royalist Right for the swirling cavalry fight between the troopers of Cromwell and Rupert to take place. Once the Royalist cavalry broke they fled, according to Slingsby, 'along by Wilstrop woodside, as fast & as thick could be'. Behind the Royalist centre, therefore, space should be allowed for this flight, at least as far as Wilstrop Wood, which had bullets embedded in the trees on its edge²⁴. The implication is that pursuit was 'hot' to this point.

Oliver Cromwell's reputation as a commander lay in his ability to keep control of his men after a success. While David Leslie's Scots cavalry harried the fleeing enemy, the men of the Eastern Association were readied for action on the far side of the battlefield. The battlefield area must accordingly give Cromwell's cavalry the scope to perform its manoeuvre of riding round the back of the Royalist infantry to engage Lord Goring's horsemen on the far flank. If the boundary were drawn around the southern tip of Wilstrop Wood and then along the White Sike as far as its junction with a field divide at OS map reference SE 497537, this would give the space required.

After skirting three fields south-eastwards from the White Sike the outer edge of the battlefield area reaches Atterwith Lane, just above the Fox Covert where the Hatterwith enclosures once stood. In light of Peter Newman's theory that the enclosures were where Newcastle's Whitecoats suffered annihilation, this ground too is embraced by the battlefield area (White Sike Close, the traditional location for the Whitecoats' doomed resistance, is already included). The battlefield boundary then continues along the approximate line of the old Atterwith Dike to Long Marston and on to the back of Cromwell's Plump, leaving sufficient room for the deployment of Sir Thomas Fairfax's cavalry on the Allied right flank.

Notes

1. Watson, Scoutmaster-General Lionel *A More Exact Relation of the late Battell neer York; Fought by the English and Scotch Forces, against Prince Rupert and the Marquess of Newcastle.* (London 1644). Printed in Peter Young *Marston Moor* (Kineton 1970) pp227-232.
2. Newman, Peter 'Marston Moor 1644-1979: The Study of a Civil War Battlefield' *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 57 (1979) pp137-143. See also the map on p47 of his *The Battle of Marston Moor* (Chichester 1981).
3. Leadman, A D H 'The Battle of Marston Moor' *Yorkshire Archaeological Journal* xi (1891) pp289-347. Barrett, C R B *Battles and Battlefields in England* (London 1896).
4. The de Gomme plan was first published by C H Firth in his 'Marston Moor' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* New Series, xii (1898) pp17-79.
5. Woolrych, A H *Battles of the English Civil War* (London 1961) p69.
6. Peter Newman's ideas developed in the course of three books and articles. 'Marston Moor, 2 July 1644: The Sources and the Site' *Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, Paper 53* (1978). 'Marston Moor 1644-1979: The Study of a Civil War battlefield' *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 57 (1979) pp137-143. *The Battle of Marston Moor 1644* (Chichester 1981).
7. Stewart, Captain William *A Full Relation of the Victory Obtained...on Marstam Moor.* Printed in Terry, C S *The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie First Earl of Leven* (London 1899) pp274-280.
8. Watson *op. cit.*
9. Lt-Col A H Burne & Lt-Col P Young *The Great Civil War* (London 1959) pp159-160.
10. Ashe, Simeon *A Continuation of True Intelligence* . Printed in Terry *op. cit.* pp266-74.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Young, Peter *Marston Moor 1644, the Campaign and the Battle* (Kineton 1970) p116.
13. Stewart *op. cit.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. Arthur Trevor to the Marquess of Ormonde, printed in Young *Marston Moor* , pp223-225.
16. Watson *op. cit.*
17. Ashe *op. cit.*
18. Watson *op. cit.*
19. Stewart *op. cit.*
20. Cholmeley, Sir Hugh 'Memorials touching the battle of York' ed. C H Firth, *English Historical Review*

- v (1890) pp347-51.
21. Somerville's account of the battle is printed in Young *Marston Moor* pp258-63.
 22. Ashe *op. cit.*
 23. *Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby* ed. D Parsons (1836), extract printed in Young *Marston Moor* pp215-7.
 24. Burne, Lt-Col A H , *The Battlefields of England* (London 1950) p229.

APPENDICES

Contemporary accounts of the Battle of Marston Moor

- A.) Simeon Ashe
- B.) Captain William Stewart
- C.) Soutmaster-General Lionel Watson
- D.) Sir Thomas Fairfax
- E.) Colonel Sir Henry Slingsby
- F.) Sir Hugh Cholmley

- A.) *A Continuation of True Intelligence* by Simeon Ashe, a chaplain with the Earl of Manchester's Army.

Before our foot could get back (which was about two or three a clock) the enemy was possessed of the Moore (a ground very advantageous) and had in many small bodies bespread themselves, that their Army did extend two miles (as its judged) in length: Yea, by the improving of this opportunitie, they had by divers regiments of Muskettiers so lined the hedge and ditch betwixt themselves and us, that our Souldiers could not assault them, without very great apparent prejudice. We were compelled to draw upon our Army, and to place it in battalia in a large field of Rie, where the height of the corn, together with the showers of rain which then fell, prov'd no small inconvenience unto our Souldiers; yet being on an hill, we had the double advantage of the ground, and the wind. Here our Noble Commander Generall Lesley exercised his Martial abilities with unwearied activity and industry. He hasted from place to place to put all our Forces in battell array, which he did to the satisfaction and admiration of all that beheld it: the other two Generals acting also in their own Armies. How goodly a sight was this to behold, when 2 mighty Armies, each of which consisted of above 20,000, horse and foot, did with flying colours prepared for the battell looke each other in the face. The posture of our Army, when drawn up, was this; Most of Generall Lesley his Horse, together with the Horse of the Lord Fairfax, made the right wing. The Earle of Manchesters Horse, with some of the Scotch Horse, were the left wing. Generall Lesleyes Foot were on the right hand, the Earle of Manchesters Foot were the left hand of the Lord Fairfax his foot who were the body. There were 3 or 4 Brigades placed for a Reserve.

Our Army being thus Marshalled, towards six or seven of the clocke we advance about two hundred paces towards the Enemy, our Canon (which had plaid one or two houres before from the top of the Hill) was drawne forward for our best advantage, our signal was a white Paper, or handkerchiffe in our hats; our word was *God with us*. The Enemies signal was *God and the King*.

Our Army in its severall parts moving downe the Hill, was like unto so many thicke clouds, having divided themselves into Brigades, consisting of eight hundred, one thousand, twelve hundred, fifteen hundred men in a Brigade. And our Brigades of Horse, consisting some of three, and some of foure Troopes.

The enemy (as some Prisoners report) was amazed and daunted at our approach, not expecting any assault till the next morning. Upon the advancing of the Earle of Manchesters Foote, after short firings on both sides, wee caused the enemy to quit the hedge in a disorderly manner, where they left behind them foure Drakes. The Lord Fairfax his Brigade on our right hand did also beat off the Enemy from the hedges before them, driving them from their Canon, being two Drakes and one Demi-culvering, but being afterwards by Marquisse New-castles Regiment of Foot, and by them furiously assaulted, did make a retreat in some disorder.

This advantage espyed by a body of the Enemies Horse, they charged through them unto the top of the hill. But one Regiment of the Earle of Manchesters Foote seeing the Enemy, both Horse and Foot, pursuing an advantage, did wheele on the right hand, upon their Flanck, and gave them so hot a charge, that they were forced to flie back disbanded into the Moore. And these Enemies were so opportunely met in the Moore, by a body of our Horse, that many of them were killed in the place, and about two hundred by the Scots Horse were taken prisoners.

Before this time, lieutenant Generall Cromwell had with much Gallantry charged through and through, and routed two of the bravest Brigades of Horse in the Enemies right wing, where were the stoutest Men and Horse which Prince Rupert had. Our Horse and Foot with undaunted courage did put the Enemies right wing to flight, forcing them both from their Canon and Ammunition: But when they came up to the Enemies left wing, hoping that our right wing had done as good service as themselves, they were disappointed, for our Horse there were beaten back: And although the Scots Musquettiers had fired there most bravely, and to good purpose, to the dissipating of the Enemies Foot, yet their Horse there stood still in full bodies; our left wing was neither wearyed by their former hot service, nor discouraged by the sight of that strength which yet the enemy had unshaken and intire, but continuing and renewing their valour, they charged every party remaining in the field, till all were fully routed and put to flight: our men pursued the Enemies about three miles, till they came neere unto Yorke.

B.) *A Full Relation of the Victory Obtained ... on Marstam-Moor*, attributed to an officer in the Scottish Army, Captain William Stewart.

...before our Van was advanced within a mile of Todcaster, we were advertised that the Prince was upon our Reare, and was come the length of Longmarston, where he drew up his Army in a place of great advantage, having the addition of the Earle of Newcastles Forces, reported to be about 6,000. With as great expedition as could be, our Army was called back.

In the mean while, the Enemy perceiving that our Cavalry had possessed themselves of a corn hill, and having discovered neer unto that hill a place of great advantage, where they might have both Sun and Winde of us, advanced thither with a Regiment of Red Coats, and a party of Horse; but we understanding well their intentions, and how prejudiciall it would be unto us if they should keep that ground, we sent out a party which beat them off, and planted there our left wing of Horse; having gained this place, Generall Lesley gave order for drawing up of the Battell ...

...Orders being given to advance, the Batell was led on by Generall Hammilton, Lieutenant Generall Baylie, and Major Generall Crawford; the Reserve being committed to the trust of Generall Major Lumsdaine: There was a great Ditch between the Enemy and us, which ran along the front of the Battell, only between the Earle of Manchesters foot and the enemy there was a plain; in this Ditch the enemy had placed foure Brigades of their best Foot, which upon the advance of our Battell were forced to give ground, being gallantly assaulted by the E. of Lindsies regiment, the Lord Maitlands, Cassilis, and Kelheads. Generall Major Crawford having overwinded the enemy set upon their flank, and did very good execution upon the enemy, which gave occasion to the Scottish Foote to advance and passe the Ditch. The right wing of our Fot [i.e. Horse] had severall misfortunes, for betwixt them and the enemy there was no passage but at a narrow Lane, where they could not march above 3 or 4 in front, upon the one side of the Lane was a Ditch, and on the other an Hedge, both whereof were lined with Musketiers, notwithstanding Sir Thomas Fairfax charged gallantly, but the enemy keeping themselves in a body, and receiving them by threes and foures as they marched out of the Lane, and (by what mistake I know not) Sir Thomas Fairfax his new leavied regiment being in the Van, they wheeled about, and being hotly pursued by the enemy came back upon the L. Fairfax Foot, and the reserve of the Scottish Foot, broke them wholly, and trod the most part of them under foot.

Sir Thomas Fairfax, Colonell Lambert, and Sir Thomas his brother with five or six Troopes charged through the enemy and went to the left wing of Horse, the two squadrons of Balgonies regiment being divided by the enemy each from the other, one of them being Lanciers charged a regiment of the enemies foot, and put them wholly to the rout, and after joyned with the left wing of Horse, the other by another way went also to the left wing; The Earle of Eglingtons regiment maintained their ground (most of the enemies going on in the pursuit of the Horse and Foote that fled) but with the losse of four Lieutenants, the Lieut. Colonell, the Major, and Eglingtons Sonne being deadly wounded, Sir Charles Lucas and Generall Major Porter having thus divided all our Horse on that wing, assaulted the Scottish Foot upon their Flanks, so that they had the Foot upon their front, and the whole Cavalry of the enemies left wing to fight with, whom they encountered with so much courage and resolution, that having enterlined their Musquetiers with Pikemen they made the enemies Horse, notwithstanding for all the assistance they had of their foot, at two severall assaults to give ground; and in this hot dispute with both they continued almost an houre, still maintaining their ground; Lieut. Generall Baily, and Generall Major Lumsdain (who both gave good evidence of their courage and skill) perceiving the greatest weight of the battell to lye sore upon the Earl of Linsies, and Lord Maitelands regiment, sent up a reserve for their assistance, after which the enemies

Horse having made a third assault upon them, had almost put them in some disorder; but the E. of Lindsey, and Lieut Colonell Pitscotti, Lieut. Col. to the Lord Maitlands Regiment, behaved themselves so gallantly, that they quickly made the enemies Horse to retreat, killed Sir Charles Lucas his Horse, tooke him Prisoner, and gained ground upon the foote.

The Scottish Dragoons that were placed upon the left wing, by the good managing of Colonell Frizell acted their part so well, that at the first assault they beate the enemy from the ditch, and shortly after killed a great many, and put the rest to the rout. L. Generall Cromwell charged Prince Ruperts horse with exceeding great resolution, and maintained his charge with no lesse valour. Generall-Major Lesley charged the Earle of Newcastles brigade of Whitecoats, and cut them wholly off, some few excepted who were taken prisoners, and after them charged a brigade of Green-coats, whereof they cut off a great number, and put the rest to the rout, which service being performed, he charged the enemies horse (with whom L. Generall Cromwell was engaged) upon the flanke, and in a very short space the enemies whole cavalry was routed, on whom our fore-troopes did execution to the very walls of Yorke; but our body of Horse kept their ground. Lieut. Generall Cromwell and Major-Generall Lesley being joyned, and receiving advertisement that our Foot were engaged with the enemies Horse and Foot, marched to their assistance, and met with the enemies Horse (being retreated upon the repulse they had from the Scottish Foot) at the same place of disadvantage where they had routed our Horse formerly; and indeed their successe was answerable, if not much worse, for we routed them wholly, killed and tooke their chiefe Officers and most part of their Standards. After which we set upon the reare of their Foot, and with the assistance of our maine battell, which all this time stood firme, we put them wholly to the rout, killed many, and tooke their Officers and Colours; and by this time we had no enemy in the Field.

- C.) *A More Exact Relation of the late Battell neere York* by Scoutmaster-General Lionel Watson, serving with Manchester's Army.

...early in the morning, wee began our march towards Cawood, with all our Armie, leaving three thousand Horse and Dragooneers to bring up the Reare of our Foote and Ordnance.

The Enemy thinking wee dislodged, because wee would avoyd fighting, and being resolved to fight with us, they drew out five thousand Horse and Dragooneers, the Vanne of their Armie, and with them tooke the Moore neare Marston, about nine of the clocke on Tuesday, and came up close to the Reare of our Carriages.

Wee feeling that they were in earnest to fight, and wee as much as they desiring it, presently commanded all our foote and Ordnance to come back with all speed, the Vanne of which was gone some five miles towards Cawood, and was with much difficultie to be brought backe. The enemy in the meane while, drawing up with part of their foote close to our noses, so neare that we had not libertie to take the Moore, and to put our selves into Battalia, so that wee were put to draw our men into a Corne-field close to the Moore, making way by our Pioneers to get ground to extend the wings of our army to such a distance, that wee might conveniently fight; which was very difficult for us to attain, The right wing of our army being placed just by Merston Town side, the town on our right hand, fronting on the East, and as our foot and horse came up, we formed our battalia and the left wing, still desiring to gain as much of the left point as we could, so that at last wee came with the utmost point of our left wing, to Topwith; being a mile and a half in length; the enemy being drawn up just under us, the wings of their army extending a little further than ours in length, but the hedges and our Dragooners secured the flanks. About two of the clock we had indifferently well formed our army, as also the enemy theirs, part of their foot being beyond Owse, that morning, which made them as late as wee in drawing up. About two of the clock, the great Ordnance of both sides began to play, but with small success to either; about five of the clock wee had a generall silence on both sides, each expecting who should begin the charge, there being a small di[t]ch and a banck betwixt us and the Moor, through which wee must pass if wee would charge then upon the Moore, or they pass it, if they would charge us in the great corn-field, and closes; so that it was a great disadvantage to him that would begin the charge, feeling the ditch must somewhat disturb their order, and the other would be ready in good ground and order, to charge them before they could recover it...

...About half an houre after seven a clock at night, we seeing the enemy would not charge us, we resolved by the help of God, to charge them, and so the signe being given, we marched down to the charge. In which you might have seen the bravest sight in the world; Two such disciplin'd Armies marching to a charge. Wee came down the Hill in the bravest order, and with the greatest resolution that was ever seen: I meane the left Wing of our Horse led by Cromwell, which was to charge their right Wing, led by Rupert, in which was all their gallant men: they being resolved, if they could scatter Cromwell, all were their own.

All the Earle of Manchesters Foot being three Brigades, began the charge with their bodies against the Marquess of Newcastle, and Prince Rupert's bravest Foot. In a moment we were passed the ditch into the Moore, upon equall grounds with the enemy, our men going in a running march. Our front divisions of Horse charged their front, Lieutenant Generall Cromwels division of three hundred Horse, in which himselfe was in person, charged the first division of Prince Ruperts, in which himselfe was in person. The rest of ours charged other divisions of theirs, but with such admirable valour, as it was to the astonishment of all the old Souldiers of the Army. Cromwels own division had a hard pull of it: for they were charged by Ruperts bravest men, both in Front and Flank: they stood at the swords point a pretty while, hacking one

another: but at last (it so pleased God) he brake through them, scattering them before him like a little dust.

At the same instant the rest of our horse of that Wing, had wholly broken all Prince Ruperts horse on their right Wing, and were in the chase of them beyond their left Wing: our Foot on the right hand of us (being onely the Earle of Manchesters Foot) went on by our side, dispersing the enemies Foot almost as fast as they charged them, still going by our side, cutting them down that we carried the whole Field before us, thinking the victory wholly ours, and nothing to be done but to kill and take prisoners; not knowing that the enemies left Wing, led by Hurry [*recte* Goring], had done as much to our right (led by Sir Thomas Fairfax), they wholly carrying the Field before them, utterly routing all our Horse and Foot, so that there was not a man left standing before them, most of the Horse and Foot of that wing, and our main battell, retreating in hast towards Todcaster and Cawood, thinking the day lost, as the enemies right wing did towards York. The enemy being in pursuit and chase of retreating men, followed them to our Carriages, but had slain few of them: for indeed they ran away before the enemy charged them. Just then our Horse and Foot from the chase of their right wing, and seeing the businesse not well in our right, came in a very good order to a second charge with all the enemies Horse and Foot that had disordered our right wing and main battell. And here came the business of the day (nay almost of the Kingdome) to be disputed upon this second charge.

The enemy seeing us come in such a gallant posture to charge them, left all thoughts of pursuit, and began to thinke they must fight again for that victory which they thought had been already got. They marching down the Hil upon us, from our Carriages, so that they fought upon the same ground, and with the same Front that our right wing had before stood to receive their charge; and wee stood in the same ground, and with the same Front which they had when they began the charge.

Our three Brigades of Foot of the Earle of Manchesters being on our right hand, on we went with great resolution, charging them so home, one while their Horse, and then again their Foot, and our Foot and Horse seconding each other with such valour, made them flie before us, that it was hard to say which did the better our Horse or Foot. Major Generall Lesley seeing us thus pluck a victory out of the enemies hands, professed Europe had no better Souldiers.

D.) *A Short Memorial of the Northern Actions* by Sir Thomas Fairfax.

...we marched away to Tadcaster; which made the Enemy to advance the faster.

Lieutenant General Cromwell, Major General [David] Leslie, and myself, being appointed to bring up the Rear; we sent word to the Generals, of the necessity of making a stand. For else, the Enemy, having the advantage, might put us in some disorder; but, by the advantage of the ground we were on, we hoped to make it good till they came back to us.

The place was Marston Fields, which afterwards gave the name to this battle. Here we drew up our Army. The Enemy was drawn up in Battalia on the Moor a little below us.

The day being, for the most part, spent in preparation, we now began to descend toward them. Lieutenant General Cromwell commanded the Left Wing of Horse; and [was] seconded by Major General [David] Leslie. I had the Right Wing [of Horse], with some Scotch Horse and Lances for my Reserves. The three Generals were with the Foot.

Our Left Wing charged first the Enemy's Right Wing; which was performed for a while with much resolution on both sides; but the Enemy, at length, was put to the worst.

Our Right Wing had not, all, so good success, by reason of the whins [furze] and ditches which we were to pass over before we could get to the Enemy, which put us into great disorder: notwithstanding, I drew up a body of 400 Horse. But because the intervals of [their] Horse, in this wing only, were lined with Musketeers; which did us much hurt with their shot: I was necessitated to charge them. We were a long time engaged one with another; but at last we routed that part of their Wing. We charged, and pursued them a good way towards York.

[I] myself only returned presently, to get to the men I left behind me. But that part of the Enemy which stood, perceiving the disorder they were in, had charged and routed them, before I could get to them. So that the good success we had at first was eclipsed much by this bad conclusion.

But our other Wing, and most of the Foot, went on prosperously till they had cleared the Field.

E.) Extract from the Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby, a Royalist Officer.

[Prince Rupert] follows the Scots in the rear, who were now upon their march, towards Marston, & in so much hast as if they meant to march clear away; the prince follows on & makes an halt at Marston town, the Scots then marching up the feild, the direct way to Tadcaster; but upon the top of the Hill they face & front towards the prince, who till now was persuad'd that they meant not to give him battle, but to march quite away. Now the prince bestirs himself, putting his men in such order as he intend'd to fight, & sending away to my Ld of Newcastle to march with all speed. The enemy makes some shot at him as they were drawing up into Battalio, & the first shot kills a son of Sir Gilbert Haughton that was Captain in the prince's army, but this was only a shewing their teeth, for after 4 shots made them give over, & in Marston corn feilds falls to singing psalms: the princes horse had the right wing, my Ld Goring the left; the foot dispos'd of with most advantage to fight, some of them drawn off to line the hedges of the Cornfeilds, where the enemy must come to charge. The enemy's consisting of 3 parts, the Scots, Manchester & Fairfax, were one mix'd with another; Cromwell having the left wing drawn into 5 bodys of horse, came off the Cony Warren, by Bilton bream, to charge our horse, & upon their first charge rout'd them; they fly along by Wilstrop woodside, as fast & as thick could be; yet our left Wing prest as hard upon their right wing, & pursu'd them over the Hill; after our horse was gone they fall upon our foot, & altho a great while they maintained the fight yet at last they were cut down & most part either taken or kill'd ... They pursu'd not, but kept the feild as many as were left, for they were fled as fast as we, & their 3 Generalls gone, thinking all had been lost.

- F.) *Memorials touching the battle of York* by Sir Hugh Cholmley, Royalist governor of Scarborough, where a body of fugitives (including the Marquess of Newcastle) fled after Marston Moor.

...the Parliament army finding themselves still pursued coming to a place of advantage, make a stand and recall those forces which marched in their van [of which] some were advanced nine miles and it is thought many would never have returned had they been respited till the next morning. The place where they made a stand was a rising ground (with some hedges and ditches and corn fields on each side) from which they might clearly see the Prince's army below in the plain, and yet themselves not so perfectly to be discerned. As soon as the Parliament army made a stand the Prince's did the like drawing themselves into order for battle, but acted nothing still in expectance of the York forces, about 9 a clock the Marquess accompanied by all the gentlemen of quality which were in York (who cast themselves into a troop commanded by Sir Thomas Mettam) came to the Prince who said, 'my Lord, I wish you had come sooner with your forces, but I hope we shall yet have a glorious day'; the Marquess informed how that his foot had been plundering in the enemy's trenches and that it was impossible to have got them together at the time prefixed, but that he had left General King about the work, who would bring them up with all the expedition that might be. The Prince seeing the Marquesses foot were not come up, would with his own foot have been falling upon the enemy, but that the Marquess dissuaded telling him he had 4,000 good foot as were in the world; about 4 a clock in the afternoon General King brings up the Marquesses foot, of which yet many were wanting, for here was not above 3,000. The Prince demanded of King how he liked the marshalling of his army, who replied he did not approve of it being drawn too near the enemy, and in a place of disadvantage, then said the Prince 'they may be drawn to a further distance'. 'No Sir', said King, 'it is too late'; It is so, King dissuaded the prince from fighting, saying 'Sir your forwardness lost us the day in Germany, where yourself was taken prisoner', upon the dissuasions of the Marquess and King and that it was so near night, the prince was resolved not to join battle that day, and therefore gave order to have provisions for his army brought from York, and did not imagine the enemy durst make any attempt; so that when the alarum was given, he was set upon the earth at meat a pretty distance from his troops, and many of the horsemen were dismounted and laid on the ground with their horses in their hands.

The reason why they fell thus suddenly upon the Prince, as many conjecture, is that a Scottish officer amongst the Prince his horse, whilst the armies faced one another, fled to the Parliament army and gave them intelligence; and it was further observed that Hurry a Scotchmen having the marshalling of the horse in the Princes right wing, his own troop were the first that turned their backs; yet I have heard the Prince in his own private opinion did not think Hurry culpable of infidelity.

Upon the alarum the Prince mounted to horse and galloping up to the right wing, met his own regiment turning their backs to the enemy which was a thing so strange and unusual he said "swounds, do you run, follow me", so they facing about, he led them to a charge, but fruitlessly, the enemy having before broken the force of that wing, and without any great difficulty, for these troops which formerly had been thought unconquerable, now upon a panic fear, or I know not by what fate, took scare and fled, most of them without striking a stroke, or having the enemy come near them, made as fast as they could to York. Those that gave this defeat were most of them Crumwell's horse to whom before the battle were joined David Lesley, and half the Scottish horse; and who kept close together in firm bodies, still falling upon that quarter of the Prince's forces which seemed to make most resistance, which were the foot who fought most gallantly and maintained the field thre hours after the horse had left them, where most of the Marquess's foot was slain being as good men as were in the world.

But as the Prince's right wing went to wracke, so his left was very prosperous, for General Goring who commanded that did with the northern horse charge the enemy's right wing so fiercely and home, as that he made the three generals viz. Manchester, the Ld. Fairfax and Lesley quit the field and fly near twenty miles several ways believing the day was lost in so much that Goring was possessed of many of their ordnance, and if his men had but kept close together as did Cromwell's, and not dispersed themselves in pursuit, in all probability it had come to a drawn battle at worst; and no great victory to be boasted of on either side; but Goring's men were much scattered and dispersed in pursuit before they could know of the defeat of the Princes right wing...